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WHAT SHOULD THE ECB “NEW NORMAL” LOOK LIKE?
This document has been   
prepared for the Monetary 
Dialogue of 20 November 
2017 between the European 
Parliament Committee on 
Economic and Monetary     
Affairs and the ECB. ■ The predictability of the exit from balance sheet policies is essential to ensure that
financial markets can digest the extra supply of securities that they will face when
the ECB will taper.
■ The question about what the central banks' balance sheets should look like in the
“new normal” come down to the objectives of central banking and whether mone-
tary policy should aim to maintain economic and financial stability.
■ The ECB should consider using balance sheet policies permanently if they prove to
be effective even in normal times and if they are complementary to the standard
policy which boils down to the change in the short-term policy rate.
■ Balance sheet policies may provide the central banks with an additional instrument
that would be useful to achieve macroeconomic stability.
■ A large balance sheet would allow the ECB to provide markets with a safe, short-
term asset, which could improve monetary policy transmission.
■ Considering that financial markets are characterized by imperfections and ineffi-
ciencies, there is a role for using balance sheet policies in the future in order to take
advantage of the effect of changing the size and the composition of the balance
sheet to create (or correct) price distortions.
■ Balance sheet policies may therefore be a useful complement to the standard
interest rate policy in order to reinforce the effect of standard policy when the trans-
mission of changes in the short-term interest rate is impaired or to mitigate the
effect of standard policy on targeted financial markets for enhancing financial
stability.
■ There seems to be a large set of arguments in favour of adding to the central bank
toolkit balance sheet policies that would support financial stability.
With the financial crisis, central banks have used new tools—balance sheet 
policies—to implement monetary policy when their action has become constrained by 
the zero lower bound (ZLB), i.e. a level of the policy rate under which no further cuts are 
expected. The implementation of those measures has led to a sharp increase in the size of 
central banks’ balance sheet. In 2017Q2, it stands at 4 500 $ bn (23.5% of US GDP) and 
4 100 € bn (27.4 % of the euro area GDP) for the Federal Reserve and the ECB, respec-
tively, while it was 900 $ bn (6,3% of the US GDP) and 1160 € bn (12,4% of the euro area 
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1.
The bulk of purchases concerns pub-
lic sector securities (PSPP) but the 
ECB is also buying asset-backed secu-
rities (ABSPP), covered-bonds (CBPP) 
and corporate sector securities 
(CSPP).
2.
See Friedman (2015) for example.
3.
By non-standard policies, we mainly 
focus on quantitative easing. The use 
of forward guidance on a more per-
manently basis may also be debated 
as a means to enhance the commu-
nication strategy of central banks.GDP) ten years before. Concerning the ECB, the evolution of the balance sheet took 
place in two stages. From October 2008 to the end of 2012, the rise was mainly driven 
by liquidity operations conducted by the ECB to address the liquidity shortage of the 
banking system. The increase was demand-driven as it resulted from the needs of 
banks. The size of the balance sheet then receded once banks started to reimburse the 
loans granted by the ECB. A second step began with the implementation of a large-
scale asset purchase programme (APP) in March 2015. Here, the dynamics resulted 
from decisions taken at the initiative of the ECB by setting a target for monthly asset 
purchases.1 It was therefore supply-driven.
During the financial crisis, similar programmes have also been implemented by the 
Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan. They are often qualified as 
quantitative easing measures. However, Bernanke (2009) prefer the term “credit 
easing” to define the Federal Reserve’s approach. A pure quantitative easing involves 
changing the size of the balance sheet and targeting the quantity of reserves held by 
banks, without specific consideration to the composition of counterpart assets. The 
credit easing aims to increase the size of the balance sheet and meanwhile to change 
the composition of assets in order to create (or to dampen) distortions in the price of 
some targeted assets.
When balance sheet policies were initially implemented, these measures were 
assumed exceptional, unconventional, especially taken in the financial crisis and zero 
lower bound context. However, it is now discussed whether those non-standard meas-
ures might become a permanent toolkit at the disposal of central banks even in normal 
times.2 Bernanke (2016) provides a summary of the arguments for retaining a large 
balance sheet. The bottom line about the question of the optimal long-run size of 
central banks’ balance sheet is that when a central bank owns large quantities of secu-
rities, it has more options both during normal and stress times. This debate will 
necessarily condition the future decisions of central banks and the extent to which they 
will end their programmes and eventually reduce the size of their balance sheet. For 
the moment, the Federal Reserve has announced a strategy to adjust downward its 
balance sheet, which starts in October 2017 while the ECB will slow down the assets 
purchases from January 2018 until September 2018 while it will continue to reinvest 
the maturing assets beyond this deadline. 
Against the backdrop of different possibilities for future monetary policies—conven-
tional policies only, a mix of conventional and unconventional policies—, many 
questions arise: will central banks’ balance sheet revert to their pre-crisis situation (in % 
of GDP) or to another “new normal” level? Will central banks continue to use balance 
sheet policies even after exiting the ZLB? We will show that the discussion on these 
issues will depend ultimately on the possible change of mandate of central banks and 
on the transmission channels of non-standard policies.3
1. Design and sequencing of exiting
The predictability of the exit from balance sheet policies is essential to ensure that 
financial markets can digest the extra supply of securities that they will face when the 
ECB will taper and that the banking system can manage the reduction in reserves it will 
be holding. To the greatest possible extent, policymakers are aiming not to surprise 
private agents in order to maintain economic and financial stability. To that end, 
central banks—the Federal Reserve and the ECB—have endeavoured to provide a clear 
communication on their future policy decisions regarding the phasing-out of uncon-
ventional measures.
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4.
Actually, it is not the first cut in pur-
chases decided by the ECB. The pro-
gramme had already been decreased 
in March 2017 when assets’ purchas-
es went from 80 bn € to 60 bn €.On October 26th, Mario Draghi has given indications on the follow-up of the asset 
purchase programmes implemented by the ECB since March 2015. The programme 
will extend until September 2018 at least. As for previous announcements, the ECB 
does not pre-commit to a final date for ending the quantitative easing (QE) and leaves 
open the possibility to purchase assets beyond September 2018. The second key 
message of the Governing council was that assets’ purchases will be reduced to 
30 bn € from January 2018. This announcement signals the start of the tapering of the 
ECB non-standard policies indicating that the size of the balance sheet will grow at a 
slower pace.4 Besides, “the Eurosystem will reinvest the principal payments from 
maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time after the 
end of its net asset purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary”. Concretely, the 
ECB will continue to implement unconventional measures until September 2018 and 
time for reducing the size of the balance sheet has not come yet.
With these decisions, the ECB strategy to phase out unconventional measures 
approximates the Federal Reserve’s plan which consisted first in tapering (reducing the 
flows of monthly purchases), second stabilizing the size of the balance sheet and third 
ending the policy of reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities. The 
reduction of the size coincides with the third stage. Regarding the increase of policy 
rates the ECB has announced that it would intervene “well past the horizon of our net 
asset purchases”, concretely not before the end of 2018. Comparing with the experi-
ence of the Federal Reserve, tapering started in January 2014 when the central bank 
progressively reduced monthly purchases by 10 bn $ each month from January to 
October. The first increase in the policy rate was decided in December 2015. The third 
stage has just been announced by the Federal Reserve and starts in October 2017. Here 
again, the FOMC (Federal open-market Committee) will proceed slowly. Considering 
the scheduled path that was described in June 2017 and assuming a 3.5% nominal 
GDP growth, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet would get back to its pre-crisis level – 
representing 6% of GDP—in 2023 (Figure 1).
Two key issues have not been addressed yet by the ECB regarding the complete 
scenario of exit from unconventional monetary policies. First, Mario Draghi has made 
clear that policy rate would increase well beyond the end of asset purchases but he has 
not provided indication on the end of the negative interest rate policy. As long as the 
main policy rate—the rate applied on main refinancing operations (MRO)—remains at 
the zero lower bound, the rate applied on deposit facilities will remain negative. But 
the ECB might choose to reduce the gap between the MRO rate and the rate on 
deposit facilities in order to end more rapidly the negative interest rate policy. 
Conversely, the rate on deposit facilities may also be kept constant even once the MRO 
rate will be increased in order to revert to the pre-crisis spread between the MRO rate 
and the rate on deposit facilities, which was 1 point.
Up to now, the ECB has not communicated on the path of its balance sheet beyond 
September 2018. It is yet possible to illustrate a scenario for the reduction in the size of 
the ECB balance sheet that would for example start in January 2020. In what follows, 
we assume that the ECB would proceed as the Federal Reserve and reduce the size of 
its balance sheet by 10 € bn during 3 months and then by 20 € bn during the next 
3 months until reaching a 50 € bn ceiling. Given the reinvestment policy announce-
ments by the ECB, we assume that the ECB would not start its operations of reducing 
the size of the balance sheet right after the end of assets purchases but later, for 
example in January 2020. This scenario would imply that the normalisation process 
would end in mid-2025. These hypotheses are arbitrary and only illustrate one among 
other scenario for the reduction on the size of the ECB’s balance sheet. The adjustment 
may start later, be spread over a longer or a shorter time span. A central issue is related 
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5.
Asset purchases appear in item “7.1 
Securities held for monetary policy 
purposes”.to the liquidity needs of the banking system. Since October 2008, all refinancing oper-
ations are conducted at fixed-rate and full-allotment and ECB recently announced that 
it will maintain the fixed-rate / full-allotment procedure until the end of 2019. Conse-
quently, any surge in liquidity needs to be automatically served by the ECB at a 
constant cost—zero under current conditions—for banks. The size of the balance sheet 
will still be partly demand driven and may still increase—through the item “5.Lending 
to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in 
euro”—after September 2018 even if the ECB stops purchasing assets.5 Though the 
outstanding amount of “Lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary 
policy operations denominated in euro” has decreased since a peak at 1 250 € bn in 
June 2012, it still represents 770 € bn (Figure 2) that is 18% of the total assets.  
Figure 1. ECB and Federal Reserve bank balance sheet
In € / $ bn
Sources: ECB, Federal Reserve, Authors calculations. Note: The potential nominal GDP growth is exogenously fixed at 
3.5% for the United States and 3% for the euro area.
Figure 2. Assets of the Eurosystem
In € / $ bn
Source: ECB.
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6.
 The Treaty actually states that “with-
out prejudice to the primary objec-
tive of price stability, the ESCB 
[European System of Central Banks] 
shall support the general policies in 
the Union”, including “full employ-
ment” and “balanced economic 
growth”.Finally, the adjustment process of the balance sheet is not the only critical issue at 
stake. There is a specific information that neither ECB nor the FED has yet communi-
cated, namely the final size of its balance sheet. As assumed in Figure 1, at the end of 
the exit process, will the ECB balance sheet be 1,500 € billion (or 12% of Eurozone 
GDP) as it was at the beginning of 2008? This is just an hypothesis and the “new 
normal” may be either lower or higher. For instance, the ECB could well decide to 
stabilize the balance sheet at 18% of Eurozone GDP, i.e. at the level prevailing in 
February 2015 before the start of the PSPP. The assessment ultimately depends on 
policy makers’ views about the potential use and effectiveness of the central bank’s 
balance sheet as a new instrument for implementing monetary policy and addressing 
financial stability.
As far as the size of central banks’ balance sheets is concerned, advocates of a large 
central bank balance sheet stress that there is finally little difference between central 
bank owning government bonds and paying interest on excess reserves to the banks 
and banks owning government bonds themselves (modulo the difference between the 
interest rate paid on excess reserves and government bond yields). The first option 
relies on a large balance sheet whereas the second one relies on a small one. Much of 
the Jackson Hole 2016 Economic Symposium was devoted to discussions on the poten-
tial benefits of retaining a large balance sheet. Two arguments emerged, one 
concerning financial stability—i.e. on whether central banks shall have a clear stability 
mandate—and the other emphasizing the monetary policy transmission—i.e. the 
mechanisms through which balance sheet policies affect the economy. We discuss 
these arguments in the following paragraphs.
2. The evolving mandate of the ECB
The mandate of the ECB has been laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Article 127 (1) and clearly emphasizes the price stability objective 
over the growth objective.6 The hierarchy introduced explicitly in the objectives of 
monetary policy in the euro area makes a difference with the dual mandate of the 
Federal Reserve in the United States. However, even if the dual mandate is not explicit 
as it is for the Federal Reserve, Friedman (2008) considers that central banks weighing 
more role on price stability also seek to achieve output growth. The dual mandate 
would therefore be implicit. In practice, the ECB has been concerned with both infla-
tion and growth. Actually, the so-called monetary rule of the Taylor-type—where the 
policy rate decreases when inflation is below the target and when the output gap is 
negative—has long nicely fitted the behaviour of the ECB. Castro (2011) estimated 
Taylor rules over the period 1999:1 to 2007:12 and found that the ECB had signifi-
cantly reacted to the inflation rate (gap) as well as the output gap.
In addition, in the context of the Banking Union, the ECB is now also in charge of 
the supervision of the banking system. This additional task makes the ECB also respon-
sible for financial stability, by means of two instruments: under the single supervision 
mechanism, the ECB has macro-prudential supervision powers over the most “signifi-
cant” banks of the Eurozone; under the single resolution mechanism, it embraces 
micro-prudential supervision powers in case of a failing bank.
It may be claimed that the ECB has de facto a triple mandate (Blot et al., 2014) and, 
as an independent institution, it is free to choose the instruments that are best suited 
to achieve its objectives. Consequently, the ECB could consider using balance sheet 
policies permanently if they prove to be effective even in normal times.
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7.
 See Smets (2014).In the current institutional framework, it seems that there is a separation between 
monetary policy and financial supervision, with the first tool targeting macroeconomic 
stability and the second tool targeting financial stability. However, financial stability 
and macroeconomic stability are closely related which makes the distinction between 
both instruments artificial. Yet, there is a growing debate on the role of monetary 
policy to achieve financial stability.7 It raises the issue of the transmission channel of 
monetary policy and notably of non-standard measures.
3. Transmission channels of balance sheet policies
Joyce et al. (2011) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) highlight several channels 
through which large-scale asset purchases could affect the economy:
1. Policy signalling effect: an announcement of large-scale asset purchases may be 
perceived as a signal of a more accommodative monetary policy and send the signal 
that monetary policy rate will remain low for a long period, at least until the end of 
the asset purchase program. This policy of “forward guidance” can also consist of 
announcing that the central bank benchmark rate will not be cut before a pre-
announced date or until the unemployment rate falls below a certain threshold (e.g. 
7% of the working population as the Bank of England did since summer 2013); or 
announcing an unlimited conditional buyback of sovereign debt to limit the upward 
pressure on government bond yields (as was the case for ECB’s Outright Monetary 
Transactions programme launched in the summer of 2012 and yet to be used). 
Considering that long-term interest rates reflect expectations of future short-term 
interest rates, announcing large-scale purchases of government bonds should 
trigger a decline in long-term rates, through the expectations channel.
2. Portfolio balance effect: if the central bank buys assets, portfolio arbitrage generates 
an increase in the prices of the assets concerned as well as assets which are close but 
imperfect substitutes, lowers yields and, thus, borrowing costs. The portfolio 
balance channel may create (or correct) a distortion in asset prices since central 
bank operations consist in increasing the demand of a class of assets. When asset 
purchases are long-term Treasuries, it will involve a reduction in the term premia, 
which adds to the policy signalling effect and triggers a further decline in long-term 
rates. The signal is also transmitted to closely related financial substitutes through 
changes in the risk premia. At the same time, higher asset prices increase the wealth 
of economic agents and thus their ability to generate more spending.
3. A liquidity effect: By buying financial assets, the central bank creates money, thus 
quickly injecting liquidity into the financial system.
4. A confidence effect: if economic agents trust a central bank policy, the announce-
ment can boost consumers and firms’ confidence and, in turn, rise spending. For 
instance, monetary policy easing may be successful in lifting inflation (expecta-
tions), thus leading to a decline in real interest rates (Eggertson and Woodford, 
2003). A confidence effect is also likely to generate an increase in asset prices and 
decrease risk premia. 
5. A bank lending channel: if QE’s modalities allow the central bank to buy assets from 
non-banks (directly or indirectly), the bank-lending channel improves. Indeed, a 
rise of banks’ reserves at the central bank, will be matched by a corresponding rise 
of deposits. Meanwhile, as non-banks’ assets become more liquid, additional loans 
can be granted.
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8.
APP includes all asset purchases    
programmes: CBPP (covered bond 
purchase programme), ABSPP        
(asset-backed securities purchase 
programme), PSPP (public sector 
purchase programme) and CSPP 
(corporate sector purchase             
programme).
9.
EONIA stands for euro-area over-
night index average. It is a measure 
of the effective interest rate prevail-
ing in the euro interbank overnight 
market and is calculated as a   
weighted average of the interest 
rates on unsecured overnight      
lending transactions denominated in    
euro, as reported by a panel of      
contributing banks.6. A default channel: with QE lowering long-term bond yields and improving macroe-
conomic perspectives, risk premia decline. This reduces the risk of sovereign default 
and gives leeway for a more accommodative fiscal policy as investors realise that 
there is a buyer-of-last-resort. In the Euro area, this would help to mitigate the risk 
of a liquidity squeeze or sudden stops of capital flows, stemming from the fact that 
in the monetary union “governments issue debt in a currency over which they have 
no control” (as explained by De Grauwe, 2012). 
7. An exchange rate channel: money creation also weakens the exchange rate, 
favouring net exports. This channel may be viewed as a consequence of the port-
folio channel as rebalancing involves the purchase of foreign assets. The seller is 
indeed in search for higher yields and may thus find profitable to hold more foreign 
assets, hence triggering a depreciation of the domestic currency.
By influencing asset prices, unconventional monetary policy measures affect invest-
ment and consumption. Since monetary policy measures alter interest rates, term- and 
risk-premia, they operate through the risk-taking channel: lower returns on some asset 
prices such as government risk-free bonds increase the incentives of agents to invest in 
riskier assets. Consequently, unconventional measures affect final demand and finan-
cial stability.
These transmission channels of unconventional monetary policy measures are often 
complementary to the transmission channels of “conventional” measures. However, 
while asset purchases may introduce price distortions and have a specific effect on the 
long end of the yield curve, standard monetary policy affects the short end of the yield 
curve. As the relative effectiveness of these different channels is mostly an empirical 
issue, this leaves open the question on the ability for central banks to use balance sheet 
policies permanently. The following section provides some detailed arguments on 
this matter.
4. Balance sheet policies as a permanent tool of monetary 
policy
Together with the increase in ECB assets, there have been substantial changes to 
the liability side of the balance sheet. Before the financial crisis, the ECB liabilities were 
mostly notes (currency) whereas today the largest category of liabilities is bank 
reserves, with the bulk of these reserves being composed of excess reserves and 
deposit facilities (Figure 3). This increase in reserves is the direct consequence of the 
ECB’s unconventional programmes first through the liquidity provided to banks with 
LTRO (long-term refinancing operations), VLTRO (very long-term refinancing opera-
tions) and TLTRO (targeted long-term refinancing operations) and more recently 
through the asset purchases programme (APP).8 
Importantly, this large increase in the amount of bank reserves changes the way a 
central bank may affect its short-term policy interest rate. Prior to the financial crisis, 
central banks managed the policy rate by adjusting the supply of reserves in the 
system. Central banks first set the policy rate to signal the stance of monetary policy 
and then set the amount of liquidity provided to the banking system. The supply of 
central bank reserves was adjusted to meet the liquidity needs—determined by 
required reserves and autonomous factors—of the banking system and to reduce the 
volatility of the overnight market interest rate (the EONIA in the euro area).9
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10.
Here excess reserves actually also in-
clude the outstanding amount of de-
posit facilities as they are perfect 
substitutes since interest applied to 
both of them are the same.With the large quantity of reserves available since the start of the asset purchases, 
changes in the supply of reserves are no longer enough to control the policy rate. The 
demand for reserves has been saturated creating downward pressures on the over-
night market rate. As a consequence, central banks now influence short-term rates 
primarily by varying the interest rate paid on excess reserves, the deposit facility rate 
for the ECB, which represents a floor rate. This setting relies on the condition that 
banks do not want to borrow or lend in the interbank markets at an interest rate 
different from what they can earn on the reserves hold at the central bank balance 
sheet. Consequently, when excess reserves are positive, the policy rate signalling the 
stance of monetary policy is not the MRO rate but the rate of deposit facilities as illus-
trated by the fluctuations of the EONIA (Figure 4) since October 2008.10 It appears 
that when excess reserves decline and revert close to zero, the EONIA rate increases 
and gets closer to the MRO rate, its reference rate before the implementation of non-
standard policies.
The question about the size of the central bank balance sheet therefore also refers 
to the preferred method of policymakers for signalling the policy rate. It is essential to 
understand that balance sheet policies may thus be implemented during normal times, 
i.e. when the policy rate is in positive territory (above the ZLB). With a “small” balance 
sheet—without excess reserves—the EONIA rate fluctuates around the MRO interest 
rate which signals the stance of monetary policy. The supply of reserves is fixed to meet 
demand and avoid too much volatility around the MRO rate. With a “large” balance 
sheet—with excess reserves—the EONIA rate would stand close to the interest rate on 
deposit facilities, whatever the level of the floor rate: -0.4%, 0% or 3%. The supply of 
reserves exceeds demand to bring the overnight market rate to the floor rate. Conse-
quently, the choice of adopting a permanently large balance sheet requires a cost-
benefit analysis of large and permanent excess reserves and the use of the deposit 
facility rate as a policy rate. 
A first argument for adopting a permanently large balance sheet has been put 
forward by Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2016). They suggest that a large balance 
sheet could be a tool for enhancing financial stability. In a situation where there is a 
strong private demand for safe and liquid short-term securities, central banks could be
Figure 3. Liabilities of the Eurosystem
   In € bn
Source: ECB.
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OFCE  policy brief |  9the ultimate provider of such an asset. Changes in bank regulation are likely to increase 
the demand for safe and liquid assets. The fact that investors accept much lower yields 
for very short-term government securities (at the one-week maturity for example) than 
for longer-term government securities (even one year for example) is a good indicator 
of such a demand. The market is able to supply such short-term assets in principle. 
However, in a period of crisis when the quality of the underlying assets is uncertain, 
this form of financing disappears, forcing banks to sell off their (quality) assets. These 
fire sales may destabilise the market and amplify the crisis. Greenwood et al. suggest 
that central banks could provide safe and liquid short-term assets as it already does 
through bank reserves. This potentially unlimited supply of a genuinely safe asset would 
reduce the liquidity premium on very short-term financing. This strategy implies that 
central banks have to keep their balance sheet expanded. A complementary argument 
for such a strategy refers to the Tinbergen principle of “one objective one instrument”: 
central banks may use their balance sheet as an instrument for enhancing financial 
stability, while they may use the policy rate for stabilising the economy.
The literature about the supply of safe assets to enhance financial stability has been 
surveyed by Golec and Perotti (2017). Short-term safe assets carry a “money-
premium” that lowers their yield as they can be used as “money-like” assets. Govern-
ment debt securities or central bank liabilities have this feature. Gorton and Metrick 
(2012) show that privately-issued short-term securities may be part of this category. 
Indeed, the incentives of private financial intermediaries to engage in maturity and 
liquidity transformations and to fund their investment by issuing collateralized short-
term debt is strong. It must be recalled that this phenomenon greatly increased the 
fragility of financial intermediaries by exposing them to larger funding risk (see Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Because public short-term securities can be close 
substitutes to private short-term debt (see Carlson et al., 2016, and Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012), monetary policy in the form of asset purchases that increase 
the supply of public short-term securities – namely central bank reserves – could thus 
lower the money premium below the one prevailing for privately issued bonds. This 
policy would then decrease the incentive of private financial intermediaries to issue 
short-term debt. Finally, central bank issuances of short-term securities would crowd-
Figure 4. Excess reserves and policy rates
In %                                                                                                                                                                     In € bn
Source: ECB.
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this mechanism can limit banks’ incentives to engage in liquidity transformation.
Second, Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) analyse the relevance of balance sheet poli-
cies together with the more traditional interest-rate policy. They find that quantitative 
easing in general is likely to be ineffective for macroeconomic stabilization (they do not 
consider financial stability), but targeted asset purchases would be effective when 
financial markets are disrupted or interest rates are at the ZLB. Their conclusion is that 
central bank's asset holdings should be irrelevant for macroeconomic stabilization in 
the case of well-functioning financial markets. However, such an assumption may not 
hold even in normal times. If financial markets are characterized by financial imperfec-
tions and inefficiencies, there is a role for using balance sheet policies: the central bank 
may take advantage of the size and the composition of the balance sheet to create (or 
correct) distortions on financial markets by influencing risk and term premia.
The recent Eurozone debt crisis following the financial crisis revived the debate 
about the loop between sovereign debt and bank risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2016) as 
the deterioration of government solvency decreases the value of the assets hold by 
financial intermediaries. This increases the probability of banks bail-outs and deterio-
rates further the initial fiscal situation. It has led to a panic-driven situation where 
sovereign yields sharply increased because of a liquidity squeeze on the market for 
sovereigns of some countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece). Under such 
circumstances, the implementation of balance sheet policies can break the vicious 
circle either by taking the risk of defaulting out of the balance sheet of commercial 
banks or by limiting the variation in sovereign bonds prices. Reis (2017) analyses the 
usefulness of central bank balance sheet policies in a fiscal crisis, modelled as a situa-
tion where the fiscal outlook is inconsistent with both stable inflation and no sovereign 
default. The crisis propagates through two channels, aggregate demand on one side, 
and credit contraction and financial disruption on the other. Reis (2017) suggests that 
the size and composition of the central bank’s balance sheet can interfere with these 
channels since central bank balance sheet policies are grounded on interest-paying 
reserves which is a special public liability, neither substitutable with currency nor 
government debt.
Third, because the real effects of monetary policy measures depend crucially on 
their transmission to financial conditions, being able to affect directly the interest rate 
faced by non-bank institutions or non-financial corporations help removing one inter-
mediate step in the transmission of policy. Indeed, in period of crisis, banks may not be 
willing to fully pass on changes in the policy rate to depositors and borrowers. The link 
between the policy rate and interest rates in securities markets may also be weak 
because of market fragmentation and inadequate liquidity. With the asset purchase 
program providing a direct effect on the securities market, central banks could rely less 
on the indirect transmission of monetary policy through the banking system. Duffie 
and Krishnamurthy (2016) suggest a similar argument for the Fed’s overnight reverse 
repurchase program, the aim of large balance sheet is to improve the transmission 
channel of monetary policy. Adler, Castro and Tovar (2016) examines whether the 
composition of central bank capital influences the conduct of monetary policy. They 
suggest that central bank capital and more specifically a measure of central bank finan-
cial strength matters for monetary policy. The distortions implied by asset purchase 
would then provide the central banks with an additional tool that would not only affect 
macroeconomic stabilization but also financial stability. It must be noticed here that 
such distortions are implied by changing the composition of the assets held by central 
banks. It does not necessarily involve increasing or reducing the size of the balance 
sheet. Balance sheet policies may therefore be a useful complement to the standard 
OFCE  policy brief |  11interest rate policy in order to reinforce the effect of standard policy when the trans-
mission channel is impaired or to mitigate the effect of standard policy on targeted 
financial markets for enhancing financial stability. 
A fourth argument for keeping a large central bank balance sheet relates to its role 
as a lender of last resort during financial crises. During a panic, central banks can 
replace the missing liquidity. However, for such a mechanism to work, banks have to 
be willing to borrow from the central bank, which they may avoid to do if they fear the 
market “stigma” associated with such borrowings (which would signal their financial 
weakness). A good example of this potential stigma are the different actions under-
taken by US and EU banks during the crisis. Because European financial institutions had 
both large deposits at the ECB (bank reserves) as well as large borrowings before the 
crisis (in contrast with the US banks), they were able to use their reserves or adjust their 
borrowings thus providing few signals to the market as regards their (weak) internal 
financial conditions. A larger central bank balance sheet therefore contributes to its 
ability to act as a lender of last resort.
A counter-argument to permanent large balance sheet for central bank relates to 
the depth and breadth of financial markets. Both features of financial markets are a 
prerequisite to large and long-lasting purchases of financial assets. This is a key argu-
ment as regards European public bonds (Blot and Creel, 2017) that can well apply to 
private bonds and stocks in the Eurozone. As a matter of fact, bank intermediation in 
the Eurozone is the major funding determinant, unlike in the US. While this is a good 
argument against a rising ECB balance sheets after the end of APP, this is not one 
against a permanent large and steady balance sheet. Moreover, it is not one against 
the permanent use of balance sheet policies under the composition argument: 
targeting financial segments through the use of balance sheet policies may correct 
distortions on these segments and lower financial fragmentation across segments or 
across Eurozone countries.
5. Conclusion
There are many arguments in favour of adding balance sheet policies to the central 
bank toolkit that would support financial stability and complement the role of the 
standard – pre-crisis – policy to enhance macroeconomic stability. However, it must be 
acknowledged that economists have not yet fully analysed the potential effect of 
balance sheet policies on macroeconomic and financial stability. Empirical uncertainty 
remains on their precise effectiveness. This should not prevent central banks to resort 
to balance sheet policies as only experience can provide a comprehensive assessment 
of the power of balance sheet policies. 
There are two major challenges when using balance sheet policies permanently. The 
first one refers to the trade-off between effectiveness and distortions. Conventional 
interest rate policy aims at market neutrality whereas balance sheet policies target 
specific securities or markets by construction. Central banks would therefore face a 
trade-off between the costs of these distortions against reaching their policy objectives. 
However, if financial markets are not efficient and are characterized by imperfections, 
balance sheet policies would not create distortions but help to mitigate them. 
The second challenge relates to communication. Under some circumstances, it 
might be needed to implement an increase in the short-term policy rate—a decision 
perceived as restrictive—while increasing the size of the balance sheet—a decision 
perceived as expansionary. If central banks have two instruments at hands –interest 
rate and balance sheet policies—they must make clear how they use them and for what 
purpose in order to avoid sending a confusing signal on the monetary policy stance  ■
Directeur de la publication  Xavier Ragot
Rédacteur en chef des publications numé
Réalisation  Najette Moummi (OFCE).  
Copyright © 2017 – OFCE policy brief  ISSN
Pour citer ce document : 
Christophe Blot, Jérôme Creel, 
Paul Hubert, « What should 
the ECB “new normal” look like? », 
OFCE policy brief 29, 20 décembre.References
Adler, G., P. Castro and C. Tovar (2016). “Does central bank capital matter for monetary 
policy?”, Open Economies Review, 27(1), 183-205.
Bernanke, B. (2009). The crisis and the policy response: speech at the Stamp Lecture. London 
School of Economics, London, England.
Bernanke, B. (2016). “Should the Fed keep its balance sheet large?”, Brookings Blogs, 
September 2, 2016.
Blot, C., and Creel, J. (2017), “Policy decentralization at the ECB”, European Parliament's 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, In-depth analysis, Directorate General 
For Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic And Scientific Policy, September.
Blot, C., Creel, J., Hubert, P., and Labondance, F. (2014). Dealing with the ECB's triple 
mandate?. Revue de l'OFCE–Debates and Policies, (134), 163-173.
Brunnermeier, M. and L. Pedersen (2009). “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity”, 
Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2201–2238.
Carlson, M., B. Duygan-Bump, F. Natalucci, B. Nelson, M. Ochoa, J. Stein, and S. Van den 
Heuvela (2016) “The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial Stability: Some 
Evidence and Implications for Central Bank Policies,” International Journal of Central 
Banking, 12(4), 307-333.
Castro, V. (2011), “Can central banks’ monetary policy be described by a linear (augmented 
Taylor rule or by a non-linear rule?”, Journal of Financial Stability, 7(4), 228-246.
Cúrdia, V. and M. Woodford (2011). “The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of 
monetary policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1), 54-79.
Duffie, D. and A. Krishnamurthy (2016). “Pass-through Efficiency in the Fed’s New Mone-
tary Policy Setting”.
Friedman, B. M. (2008). Why a dual mandate is right for monetary policy. International 
Finance, 11(2), 153–165.
Friedman, B. M. (2015). Has the financial crisis permanently changed the practice of mone-
tary policy? Has it changed the theory of monetary policy?. The Manchester School, 
83(S1), 5-19.
Golec, P. and E. Perotti (2017). “Safe Assets: A Review”, ECB Working Paper, No. 2035.
Gorton, G. and A. Metrick (2012). “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 104, 425–451.
Greenwood, R., S.G. Hanson and J.C. Stein (2016). ”The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet as 
a financial-stability tool”, Jackson Hole Symposium: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Krishnamurthy, A. and A. Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) “The Aggregate Demand for Treasury 
Debt,” Journal of Political Economy, 120, 233–267.
Reis, R. (2017). “QE in the Future: The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet in a Fiscal Crisis”, IMF 
Economic Review, 65(1), 71–112.
Smets, F. (2014). Financial stability and monetary policy: How closely interlinked?. Interna-
tional Journal of Central Banking, 10(2), 263-300.
Woodford, M. (2016) “Quantitative Easing and Financial Stability,” NBER Working Paper, 
22285.riques  Guillaume Allègre
 2271-359X. All Rights Reserved.
www.ofce.sciences-po.fr    @ofceparis
Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques  l  Centre de recherche en économie de Sciences Po
10, place de Catalogne   l   75014 Paris    l   Tél/ 01 44 18 54 00 
